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LEVITZ FURNITURE CO.: THE END OF CELANESE AND 
THE GOOD-FAITH DOUBT STANDARD FOR 
WITHDRAWING RECOGNITION OF INCUMBENT UNIONS 
SARAH PAWLICKI∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
For fifty years, the National Labor Relations Board (the 
“NLRB”) utilized a seemingly straightforward standard to an em-
ployer’s attempt to withdraw recognition of an incumbent union—
whether the employer had a good-faith belief that the union did not 
enjoy the support of a majority of the employees.1  In reality, this 
standard became muddled when the NLRB applied this same good-
faith standard to an employer’s withdrawal of recognition of an 
incumbent union, an employer’s petition for a Representative Man-
agement (“RM”) election, and an employer’s poll of its employees to 
determine the union’s majority status.2  As a result, the NLRB often 
converted the good-faith doubt standard into a higher and more 
difficult standard to satisfy, and employers were required to demon-
strate their “good faith” with objective evidence that a majority of the 
employees renounced their union.3 
The United States Supreme Court upheld the good-faith stan-
dard in Allentown Mack v. NLRB, holding the application of a 
unitary standard to all three forms of tests to a union’s majority status 
was consistent with the National Labor Relations Act (“the Act”).4  
However, the Supreme Court disapproved of the NLRB’s use of the 
words “good faith” when in practice the NLRB was applying a 
stricter standard.5  The Court held the NLRB, in the interest of 
 
         ∗    J.D., University of Toledo College of Law, May 2003. 
 1. See Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 673 (1951). 
 2. See Maria Fabre Manuel, Comment, Abolishing the Withdrawal of Recognition 
Doctrine: Serious Doubts about the Good Faith Doubt Test, 55 LA. L. REV. 913, 927 (1995). 
 3. See Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the NLRB: Employer Challenges to an Incumbent 
Union, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 653, 678 (1991). 
 4. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 364 (1998).  In this 
article, “the Act” refers to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151  (2000). 
 5. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., 522 U.S. at 376. 
 382 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 78:381 
 
judicial review, must adhere to the meaning of generally accepted 
legal standards.6  In response, the NLRB issued its decision in Levitz 
Furniture Company.7 
In Levitz, the employer withdrew recognition of the union be-
cause of what it believed was evidence of its good-faith doubt of the 
union’s majority status, a petition from a majority of the employees 
stating the employees no longer wanted to be represented by the 
union.8  The NLRB took this opportunity to rectify its unitary good-
faith doubt standard and to formally create a more stringent standard 
to which employers must adhere before withdrawing union recogni-
tion.9 
  Pre-Levitz opinions created confusion among employers and 
unions regarding the appropriate response when a question existed 
about the union’s support from a majority of its members.  Levitz was 
the NLRB’s effort to clear up the confusion and to promote its 
preferred method to determine a union’s status, namely NLRB-
controlled elections.10  In so doing, Levitz actually tied the hands of 
employers, who are now forced to continue recognition of a union 
that may no longer enjoy majority support.  The employer has only 
one option outside of obtaining actual objective evidence that the 
union no longer enjoys majority support—petition for an RM election 
that will be subject to numerous union-initiated blocking charges.11  
The impact of Levitz upon labor-management relations remains to be 
seen, but most likely it will lead to more incidences of employers 
continuing to recognize a union even though that union does not 
represent a majority of the employees and to more petitions for RM 
elections. 
Part I of this Comment describes the union decertification proc-
ess.  Parts II and III will discuss and analyze pre-Levitz decisions of 
the NLRB and the Supreme Court’s decision in Allentown Mack.  
Part IV will review the Levitz decision.  Finally, Part V will discuss 
 
 6. Id. at 376–77. 
 7. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. (Mar. 29, 2001). 
 8. Id. at 4. 
 9. See id. at 2. 
 10. See id. at 15. 
 11. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 654.  Blocking charges are charges of unfair labor practices 
filed by a union or an employee against the employer for violations of the Act.  No decertifica-
tion elections may be held while there are pending unfair labor practice charges.  Therefore, it is 
a common union tactic to file these charges in an effort to delay the election process to provide 
time for the union to reorganize and rally the support of the employees. 
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the possible impact of Levitz on the future of labor-management 
relations. 
I. THE UNION DECERTIFICATION PROCESS 
There are three methods by which a new union is certified and an 
incumbent union is decertified: withdrawal of recognition, NLRB 
controlled elections, and polling.  First, however, it is necessary to 
discuss at what point an incumbent union’s status may be challenged. 
Once a new union is certified, it enjoys an irrebuttable presump-
tion of majority representation for one year, and an employer is 
required to bargain with the union for the remainder of the collective 
bargaining agreement, up to three years.12  Only after these terms 
have expired, or under extremely unusual circumstances, does the 
presumption of majority status become rebuttable.13 
 The contract bar rule effectively requires the employer to 
recognize a union throughout the term of a collective bargaining 
agreement, up to three years,14 regardless of the employees’ support 
of the union.15  Once the presumption of majority status becomes 
rebuttable, the employer has three choices: withdraw recognition 
based upon the union’s actual loss of majority support, file a petition 
for an RM election with the NLRB based upon the good-faith uncer-
tainty of the union’s majority status, or poll the employees to deter-
mine whether there is actual union support.16  In addition, the 
employees may file a decertification petition if at least 30 percent of 
them wish to determine the majority status of the union.17 
A. Unilateral Withdrawal of Recognition 
Prior to Levitz, an employer could withdraw recognition of the 
union once its status became rebuttable.18  The employer had to show 
the withdrawal was based upon a good-faith doubt of the union’s 
 
 12. James M.L. Ferber & R. Scott Ferber, Withdrawal of Recognition: The Impact of 
Allentown Mack and Lee Lumbar, 14 LAB. LAW 339, 340 (1998). 
 13. See id. at n.8. 
 14. NLRB v. Arthur Sarnow Candy Co., 40 F.3d 552, 556–57 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 15. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 388 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992). 
 16. See Manuel, supra note 2, at 916–17. 
 17. Id. at 916. 
 18. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 15, at 571; see also Manuel, supra 
note 2, at 921. 
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majority status at the time recognition was withdrawn.19  Until Levitz, 
an employer could legally withdraw recognition of an incumbent 
union without actual proof of the lost majority status, relying instead 
on only a good-faith doubt of the lost status.20 
Employers obviously preferred to withdraw recognition over the 
other methods because, as long as they could convince the NLRB 
their withdrawal was in good faith, they could lawfully discontinue 
bargaining with the union.21  The other methods, petitioning for 
election and polling, were considerably more cumbersome and time 
consuming, and required the employer to continue to negotiate with 
the union, possibly allowing the union time to regain support from the 
employees.22  Levitz would turn the tables on employers and blatantly 
advance the NLRB-favored method of determining a union’s status, 
NLRB-controlled elections.23 
B. Petitioning for an RM Election 
Before Levitz, employers were permitted to submit a petition for 
an RM election based upon the same good-faith doubt standard 
applied to the unilateral withdrawal of recognition.24  While the 
NLRB favored an election process that it controlled because of the 
drawn-out process and the likelihood of the union’s filing unfair labor 
practice charges, employers did not favor the RM election.25  If an 
employer petitioned for an RM election and the NLRB determined 
that the petition was based upon a good-faith doubt of the union’s 
majority status, it conducted a carefully orchestrated election to 
encourage maximum employee participation and accurate election 
results.26  While an RM election did produce accurate results, it also 
required the employer to bargain with the union.  Therefore, many 
employers simply decided to forego the RM election and withdraw 
recognition of a union.27  After all, the same good-faith doubt stan-
 
 19. Manuel, supra note 2, at 921. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Comment, Application of the Good-Faith-Doubt Test to the Presumption of Continued 
Majority Status of Incumbent Unions, 1981 DUKE L.J. 718, 732 (1981). 
 22. See id. at 730–31. 
 23. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pac., Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 15 (Mar. 29, 
2001). 
 24. Id. at 14. 
25.   See Flynn, supra note 3, at 654. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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dard applied to both the withdrawal of recognition as well as the 
petition for an RM election. 
C. Employer Polling 
Employer-conducted polling is the NLRB’s least-favored decerti-
fication instrument.28  Polling allows an employer to quickly deter-
mine the actual employee support for a union.29  However, the results 
of polls have been deemed by the NLRB to be unreliable and fraught 
with unfair labor practices.30  NLRB-controlled elections are con-
ducted under tight watch and anything less than these controls invites 
unfair labor practices charges.31 
 
D. Employee Decertification 
Finally, employees may file a decertification (“RD”) for an elec-
tion upon showing 30 percent of the employees desire to withdraw 
from the union.32  This petition is therefore most useful when the 
employees are well organized and knowledgeable.33  Since the em-
ployees file the RD petition, there is no showing necessary of the 
employer’s good-faith doubt.  Levitz had no impact on the RD 
petition and it continues to be a viable method of union decertifica-
tion. 
II. RELEVANT DECISIONS PRIOR TO LEVITZ FURNITURE CO. 
Over the years, the NLRB has developed and extended the 
good-faith doubt standard to the withdrawal of incumbent union 
recognition, petitions for RM elections, and polls of employees.34  
This Section will discuss the relevant cases and doctrine leading up to 
 
 28. See id. at 663. 
 29. Id. at 665. 
 30. Id. at 664.  In Struksnes Construction Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967), the NLRB 
held that employer polls would constitute an unfair labor practice unless: the poll is to 
determine whether the validity of a union’s claims to majority status; this purpose is told to the 
employees; employees are assured that there will be no reprisal; the poll is conducted by secret 
ballot; and the atmosphere is not coercive.   
 31. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 665–66. 
 32. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2000); see also 1 JOHN D. FEERICK ET AL., NLRB 
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 191 (3d ed. Supp. 1989). 
 33. See Comment, supra note 21, at 730. 
 34. See infra Part II.A–C. 
 386 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 78:381 
 
Levitz:  Celanese Corp. (good-faith doubt standard is applied to 
employer’s withdrawing recognition of a union);35 U.S. Gypsum 
(good-faith doubt standard is applied to employer’s petition for an 
RM election);36 and Texas Petrochemicals Corp. (good-faith doubt 
standard is applied to employer’s polling of employees).37   
A. Celanese and the Good-faith Doubt Standard 
In 1951, the NLRB set the standard for employers to withdraw 
recognition from unions that the employer believed no longer repre-
sented a majority of the employees.  In Celanese Corp. of America,38 
the NLRB decided the employer only needed a good-faith belief that 
a majority of the employees no longer supported the union to with-
draw recognition.39  The Celanese decision guided NLRB decisions for 
the next fifty years and paved the way for the development of a 
method for employers to withdraw union recognition. 
Celanese Corporation (“Celanese”) opened a plant in Texas in 
1945, and several months later a union was certified as the bargaining 
representative of the employees.40  In 1948, Celanese and the union 
entered into negotiations; however, they reached an impasse over 
wage rates, broke off the negotiations, and the union called a strike 
that completely shut down the plant.41  After two months, Celanese 
decided to reopen its plant and offered any employee who returned 
to work a raise equivalent to what had been offered to, and rejected 
by, the union.42  Eventually all of the positions were filled at the 
Celanese plant, and employees hired outside the plant replaced any 
striking employees who did not return to work.43  The union re-
quested renewed bargaining; however, Celanese responded that it 
was operating at full capacity and that “to the best of our [Celanese’s] 
knowledge and belief, the Union does not represent any of the 
employees now working in this plant.”44  Although the trial examiner 
 
       35.   See infra Part II.A. 
       36.   See infra Part II.B. 
 37. See infra Part II.C. 
 38. 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951). 
 39. See id. at 671. 
 40. Id. at 668. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 669. 
 44. Id. at 670.  In actuality, Celanese was operating at full capacity but with only approxi-
mately 50% of the original number of employees.  The NLRB held that this workforce 
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held the union had represented a majority of the employees hired 
back in 1948, the lapse of three years since the last certification 
rebutted the presumption of continued majority support.45 
The NLRB agreed with the trial examiner’s decision that Cela-
nese had not violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act, but disagreed with 
the trial examiner’s rationale and changed the method by which 
employers could withdraw union recognition.46  The NLRB changed 
the question presented by the trial examiner from “whether there was 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of continued majority 
status or to demonstrate that the Union in fact did not represent the 
majority of the employees” to “whether the Employer in good faith 
believed that the Union no longer represented the majority of the 
employees.”47  The NLRB further stated that the good-faith issue 
could not be determined through a formula, but rather by taking into 
account all circumstances of the decision to withdraw recognition.48 
 To accomplish this, the NLRB held that two prerequisites were 
essential to finding the employer acted in good faith in withdrawing 
recognition of a previously certified union.49  First, the employer must 
have possessed reasonable grounds for believing the union no longer 
enjoyed majority support.50  Second, the withdrawal of recognition 
based on the lack of majority support could not have occurred during 
times of other unfair labor practice violations or antiunion activities 
intended to undermine union support.51  The NLRB in Celanese held 
the record did not indicate any reason for finding that the company 
had not acted in good faith.52  Since Celanese acted in good faith, 
there was no need to decide whether or not the union actually repre-
sented a majority of the employees.53 
 
reduction resulted from the hiring of an independent contractor to handle much of the plant 
maintenance and the improved operating methods that were implemented during the strike.  
The NLRB held that these workforce reductions were lawful.  Id. 
 45. Id. at 671. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. at 673. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 675. 
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B. United States Gypsum and the Standard for Petitions for   
Elections 
In the 1966 decision United States Gypsum Co., the NLRB held 
when a certified union requests recognition, the employer must prove 
it has reasonable grounds for doubting the majority status of the 
union to request an RM election.54  The extension of the good-faith 
doubt standard to RM petitions was an effort to protect incumbent 
unions from repeated election petitions that employers tended to 
bring at the end of contracts or whenever a company was sold.55  The 
NLRB’s decision rested on the goal of protecting the rights of the 
employees through continuity and stability in the bargaining of the 
employer and the incumbent union.56 
This decision involved U.S. Gypsum’s purchase of a quarry, lime 
plant, and mine from United Cement Company.57  U.S. Gypsum 
temporarily closed operations and upon reopening rehired all but 
three of United Cement’s former employees.58  However, U.S. 
Gypsum refused to check off union dues as required under the union 
contract with United Cement.59  After the union filed a grievance, 
U.S. Gypsum withdrew recognition of the union.60  U.S. Gypsum then 
filed a petition for a representation election.61  The NLRB decided 
this matter could be decided on a more fundamental principle, 
namely, whether U.S. Gypsum could, in good faith, doubt the contin-
ued majority representation of the union and therefore be entitled to 
an RM election.62 
The employer’s good-faith doubt of majority status was not ques-
tioned upon the filing of a petition for an RM election.63  Previous 
NLRB decisions had held that if an employer filed a petition for an 
election to determine the standing of a union that claimed to repre-
sent the employees, and the employer declined to recognize the 
 
 54. U.S. Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652, 656 (1966). 
 55. Id. at 655. 
 56. See id. at 655–56. 
 57. Id. at 653. 
 58. Id.  Two of the employees did not pass the physical examination and one of the 
employees resigned.  Id. at n.1. 
 59. See id. at 653–54. 
 60. Id. at 654. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 654–55. 
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union, a question concerning representation had been raised.64  
However, in evaluating the petitions, the NLRB had not questioned 
the good faith of the employer’s withdrawal of recognition; further-
more, when the employer was a new owner, the NLRB consistently 
granted the petitions for election.65  The NLRB in U.S. Gypsum held 
a new owner could not justify refusing to bargain with a certified 
union by relying solely upon its new ownership.66 
The NLRB looked to the legislative history of section 9(c)(1)(B) 
of the Act to decide when an employer could petition for a represen-
tation election.67  The NLRB’s analysis of the section did not find a 
unilateral right for employers to question a union’s majority status.68  
Rather, it found Congress’ underlying purpose was to permit elec-
tions when employers had “reasonable grounds for believing” that 
the union no longer represented a majority of the employees.69 Thus, 
the NLRB concluded Congress required a good-faith doubt for an 
employer to question the majority status of a union and to request an 
RM petition.70 
The decision in U.S. Gypsum stood for the proposition that when 
an employer wished to file a petition for election, it needed objective 
evidence to support its reasonable belief for doubting the union’s 
majority status.71  This decision, while seeming to clear up the confu-
sion over whether a petition for an RM election should be granted, 
effectively created additional confusion by employing the same 
standard used for an employer seeking to withdraw union recogni-
tion.72 
The NLRB’s attempt to restrain employers from constantly peti-
tioning for election by requiring good-faith doubt clearly backfired.  
Instead of petitioning for election, the employers withdrew recogni-
tion of the union and refused to bargain based upon the same good-
faith doubt that would have permitted a certification election.73  To 
quell this effect, the NLRB began interpreting the good-faith doubt 
 
 64. Id. at 654 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. X-ray, 129 N.L.R.B. 846, 847 (1960); 
Andrews Indus., Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 946 (1953)). 
 65. Id. at 654–55. 
 66. Id. at 655. 
 67. See id. at 655–56. 
 68. Id. at 656. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 654. 
 73. See id. at 678. 
 390 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 78:381 
 
requirement in such a way as to make the requirement increasingly 
difficult to meet.74  This would result in the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Allentown Mack Sales and Service, Inc. v. NLRB.75  
Before the Allentown Mack decision, however, the NLRB would also 
apply the good-faith doubt standard to employee polling. 
C. Texas Petrochemicals and the Polling Standard 
Employers who wished to poll their employees regarding their 
support for the incumbent union would also be required to demon-
strate good-faith doubt.  In 1989, the NLRB issued its decision on the 
matter in Texas Petrochemicals.76 The administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”) found the employer violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the 
Act77 by conducting its own poll of its employees, without notifying 
the union in advance, to determine whether there was continued 
majority support of the union.78  The decision came after several 
circuits refused to extend the “reasonable doubt” standard to poll-
ing.79  The NLRB stated that the reasonable doubt standard was 
appropriate for polling because “[t]he similarity of purposes and 
potential consequences of employer-conducted polls and employer-
initiated, NLRB conducted RM elections suggests that we apply 
similar standards for determining when such polls and elections may 
be conducted.”80  This analysis neglected to consider that the em-
ployer may withdraw recognition of a union based upon this same 
standard, and that poll results are inherently less reliable than an 
NLRB-conducted RM election.81  The NLRB’s decision in Texas 
Petrochemicals created the quagmire that eventually led to the 
problem presented in Levitz. 
 
 74. Id. at 678–79. 
       75.   See infra Part III. 
 76. Tex. Petrochem. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1989). 
 77. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively 
with employees’ representatives.  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice “to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of” their rights under 29 U.S.C. § 
157 (giving employees the right to bargain collectively, among others). 
 78. See Tex. Petrochem. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. at 1058. 
 79. See id. at 1059.  (citing Forbidden City Rest. v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Thomas Indus. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 651 F.2d 
1141 (5th Cir. 1981)).    
 80. Id. at 1060. 
 81. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 660. 
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In 1984, Texas Petrochemical Corporation purchased the Petro-
Tex Chemical Corporation, which had 103 union members.82  The 
President of the company spoke with several employees who said that 
the union did not enjoy majority support.83  Over the next several 
weeks, company supervisors reported twenty-three different employ-
ees who expressed unhappiness with the union.84  The company 
decided that there was sufficient uncertainty to warrant a poll, which 
resulted in thirty-five votes in favor of the union and fifty votes in 
opposition.85  The company then notified the union that the employ-
ees had voted to discontinue union representation and that the 
company would no longer recognize the union.86 
The NLRB held the company had violated sections 8(a)(5) and 
(1) of the Act for lack of sufficient evidence to constitute a reasonable 
doubt of the majority status of the union to conduct a poll.87  The 
NLRB applied a reasonable doubt standard to polling, contrary to the 
decisions of three circuits.88  The NLRB disagreed with the analysis of 
the circuit courts and decided that employers may withdraw recogni-
tion of unions with the support of poll results that reflect a loss of 
majority status because a proper poll was the same as if an NLRB 
election had occurred.89  For this reason, the NLRB felt similar 
standards should be applied to each method of determining whether a 
union had maintained majority support.90  In fact, the NLRB sug-
gested that employer-conducted polls should face higher standards 
since the polls were conducted outside of the watchful eye of the 
NLRB, unlike the “strict procedural formality of Board-conducted 
RM elections.”91  The NLRB’s apparent distrust of the results of 
employer polls did not lead it to abandon this procedure, but rather 
to bolster the standard to conduct such a poll.92  While the NLRB 
recognized the employer’s right to poll and that such polls did not 
 
 82. Tex. Petrochem. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. at 1057. 
 83. Id. at 1057. 
 84. Id. at 1057–58. 
 85. See id. at 1058.  Out of the 103 eligible employees, eighty-six votes were submitted; one 
vote was void.  There was no explanation provided for the other seventeen eligible employees.  
Id. at n.7. 
 86. Id. at 1058. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1059. 
 89. See id. at 1059–60. 
 90. Id. at 1060. 
 91. Id.  
 92. See id. at 1061. 
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need to be conducted with the stringent formalities of the RM elec-
tions, it also held unions must be notified in advance of a poll and that 
the employer should adhere to the procedural safeguards of Struksnes 
Construction Co.93 
Because polling, RM elections, and withdrawal of recognition 
could all possibly result in the employees’ loss of representation and 
the union’s loss of recognition, the NLRB reasoned that the same 
standard should be applied to each method.94  It noted it favored 
Board-conducted RM elections over polling, but recognized employ-
ers’ right to poll.95 
The rationale of Texas Petrochemicals is curious.  On the one 
hand it said that the reasonable doubt standard is sufficient to peti-
tion for an RM election, polls, or even withdrawal of union recogni-
tion altogether.  However, it also indicated that the NLRB clearly 
preferred the RM elections and distrusted employer polling, while not 
even discussing unilateral withdrawal of recognition. 
Rather than permit an employer unilaterally to subject a collective-
bargaining representative to an in-house test of strength under cir-
cumstances where the Board itself would refuse to conduct such a 
test, the Board requires at least as stringent an evidentiary loss-of-
support predicate for an employer-conducted in-house election as 
that which is required for a Board-conducted election.96 
After the NLRB established a unitary standard, employers were 
left to decide whether their information regarding the majority status 
of a union was sufficient enough to meet the good-faith doubt stan-
dard.  The NLRB’s interest in promoting industrial stability, which 
led to the good faith doubt standard, resulted in a unitary standard 
that actually encouraged employers to unilaterally withdraw recogni-
tion of a union.97  Consequently, employers would forego the petition 
or polling route and withdraw recognition of the union based upon 
their good faith doubt. 
This unitary standard clouded the meaning of the good-faith 
doubt test.98  The NLRB stated that employers did not need objective 
proof that a majority of the employees did not support the union, but 
 
 93. Id.; see also Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).  
 94. See Tex. Petrochem. Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. at 1066. 
 95. Id. at 1061. 
 96. Id. at 1060–61. 
 97. See Flynn, supra note 3, at 661. 
 98. See id. at 654. 
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that multiple factors could support good-faith doubt.99  However, 
after the Texas Petrochemicals decision, it became increasingly 
evident that the NLRB was requiring objective proof that would 
support the employer’s good faith doubt.100  This continued until 
Allentown Mack was decided in 1998.101 
III. ALLENTOWN MACK: THE SUPREME COURT’S ATTEMPT TO 
SETTLE THE GOOD-FAITH DOUBT TEST 
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court attempted to settle 
once and for all the meaning of the good-faith doubt standard.  The 
Court in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB determined 
that the good-faith reasonable doubt standard was consistent with the 
Act.102  However, the Court took exception with the NLRB’s defini-
tion of good faith.103  Although the NLRB had argued doubt meant 
disbelief, the Court disagreed, stating “[t]he Board’s finding to the 
contrary rests on a refusal to credit probative circumstantial evidence, 
and on evidentiary demands that go beyond the substantive standard 
the Board purports to apply.”104  The Court was attempting to put to 
rest the problems that had developed with the good-faith doubt test, 
namely that the NLRB was actually requiring objective proof that the 
union no longer enjoyed majority support, rather than simply a good-
faith doubt by the employer.105 
 Allentown Mack arose from this disagreement over the meaning 
of good-faith doubt.  In 1990, Allentown Mack purchased a factory 
branch of Mack Trucks.106  Near the time of the sale, several Mack 
employees told Allentown Mack that they no longer supported the 
incumbent union.107  After the sale, the union requested that Allen-
town Mack recognize their representation of the employees.108  The 
company responded that it had a good-faith doubt that the union still 
represented a majority of the employees, and that the company would 
be conducting a secret poll of the employees to determine if there was 
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majority support.109  The poll was conducted and the union lost 
nineteen to thirteen.110  The ALJ decided that the Company had 
violated sections 8(a)(5) and (1) because the Company conducted a 
poll and withdrew recognition of the union without an “objective 
reasonable doubt” of the union’s majority status.111  The court of 
appeals upheld the judge’s decision.112   
 The Supreme Court recognized that “[c]ourts must defer to the 
requirements imposed by the Board if they are ‘rational and consis-
tent with the Act.’”113 While ruling that the use of a unitary standard 
is not inconsistent with the Act, the Court decided that the evidence 
did not support the NLRB’s finding that Allentown Mack did not 
have a reasonable doubt.114 
The Court first discussed Allentown Mack’s contention that the 
NLRB’s unitary standard made it irrational for an employer to 
conduct a poll, thus making polls useless, since the same standard was 
required for the employer to withdraw recognition of a union.115  The 
Court rejected this argument, stating situations exist when an em-
ployer might choose to simply poll the employees, rather than make 
the more drastic decision to unilaterally withdraw recognition.116  An 
employer that has a good-faith doubt may choose to poll its employ-
ees to gain conclusive evidence of the fact that the union no longer 
enjoys majority status.117  Since the NLRB argued that polling should 
require a more rigorous standard because of its obvious preference 
for the RM election, a counter argument existed that would require a 
less stringent standard for polling.118  The Court noted a union that 
lost a poll could request an election, but a union that lost an election 
could not seek another election for one year.119  To settle this dispute, 
the Court found it not irrational to “split the difference” and required 
the same standard for both polls and elections.120 
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 110. Id. at 362–63. 
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The Court held the unitary good-faith doubt standard was ra-
tional, but decided that the application of the standard by the NLRB 
to the facts of the case was not.121  The NLRB’s definition of “doubt” 
in the polling standard only meant “disbelief” and not “uncer-
tainty.”122  The Court took exception to this “linguistic revisionism” 
and held that a reasonable jury could have found Allentown had a 
reasonable uncertainty (not disbelief) that the union no longer 
represented a majority of the employees.123  The Court reasoned the 
NLRB’s standard of disbelief demanded the Company provide more 
evidence than the substantive standard actually required.124 
Later in the opinion, the Court discussed the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the NLRB’s decision-making authority.125  The 
Court noted reasoned decision-making required the uniform applica-
tion of judicial standards,126 and consistently requiring a different 
standard than the pronounced standard did not achieve this goal.127  
The Court chided the NLRB: 
Reviewing courts are entitled to take those standards to mean what 
they say, and to conduct substantial-evidence review on that basis.  
Even the most consistent and hence predictable Board departure 
from proper application of those standards will not alter the legal 
rule by which the agency’s fact-finding is to be judged.128 
The Court noted that the NLRB possessed the power to adopt 
substantive law; however, in this case the NLRB consistently dis-
counted some evidence and amplified what the evidence must 
prove.129  To create substantive law, the NLRB needed to act consis-
tently with “clearly understood legal standards.”130 
Allentown Mack was the Court’s effort to restrain the NLRB’s 
adjudicating authority.  The opinion required the NLRB to conform 
to the legal standards of the judiciary system so that, in judicial 
review, courts could understand the rule of law that the NLRB had 
set in place.131  The NLRB read this decision as an opportunity to 
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promulgate new legal rules that conformed to the Supreme Court’s 
“legal standards” and overturned a fifty-year-old precedent in Levitz 
Furniture. 
IV. LEVITZ FURNITURE 
On March 29, 2001, the NLRB issued its decision in Levitz Furni-
ture Co. of the Pacific.132  The NLRB held that employers could no 
longer permissibly withdraw recognition of a union based upon a 
good-faith belief that a majority of the employees no longer support 
the union.133   
A. Facts 
Levitz Furniture Company of the Pacific (“Levitz”) was a retail 
furniture sales company located in San Francisco, California.134  Levitz 
received a petition from a majority of the employees asserting they no 
longer wished to be represented by the union in upcoming negotia-
tions.135 Levitz promptly notified the union that, pursuant to the 
petition, it would no longer recognize the union after its current 
contract expired.136  The union responded two weeks later stating it 
had proof it continued to enjoy the support of a majority of the 
employees, although it did not provide the nature of the evidence and 
Levitz did not request it.137  Nonetheless, Levitz withdrew recognition 
of the union at the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, 
relying on the petition from the employees, which it felt supported its 
good-faith belief that the union no longer represented a majority of 
the employees.138 
B.  Unfair Labor Practice Charges 
Upon the withdrawal of recognition of the union by Levitz, the 
union filed charges with the NLRB alleging Levitz violated sections 
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.139  Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor 
 
 132. 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. (Mar. 29, 2001). 
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practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees. . . .”140  Section 8(a)(1) prohibits 
employers from impeding employees in exercising their section 7 
rights.141  Section 7 guarantees all employees the opportunity to 
engage in collective bargaining through labor organizations.142  The 
union’s charges resulted from Levitz’s decision to withdraw recogni-
tion of the union at the expiration of its collective bargaining agree-
ment.143 
The NLRB decided Levitz had demonstrated a good-faith uncer-
tainty as to the majority support of the union.144  However, in doing 
this, the NLRB overruled precedent and significantly changed the 
good-faith doubt standard for employers who wish to withdraw 
recognition of an incumbent union.145  For fifty years, Celanese had 
permitted employers to withdraw recognition of a union based upon 
“whether the Employer in good faith believed that the Union no 
longer represented the majority of the employees.”146  However, 
Levitz ended the good-faith doubt test as applied to the unilateral 
withdraw of recognition and instead extended this standard to em-
ployers who wished to obtain an RM election.147 
V. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF PRECEDENT TO LEVITZ 
FURNITURE CO. 
At first blush the NLRB’s decision to overrule Celanese seemed 
to be a blow to employers who, just two years before, were at least 
partially victorious in the Supreme Court’s decision in Allentown 
Mack.  In applying the good-faith doubt standard to situations in 
which majority union representation was in question, Levitz is not far 
from what the NLRB had actually been doing for years.148  While 
purporting to rely on a good-faith doubt standard, the NLRB had 
been requiring far more, going so far as to require actual objective 
evidence that the employees did not wish to be represented by the 
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union before the employer’s decision could have been made in good 
faith. 
A. Actual Loss of Majority Status Required for Withdrawal of Union 
Recognition. 
Celanese established the good-faith doubt standard for withdraw-
ing recognition of a union that no longer represented a majority of 
the employees.149  Over the years, the NLRB grew uncomfortable 
with this standard as it afforded the employer too much control over 
union recognition.  It felt good faith was not a difficult standard to 
meet, and under the guise of industrial stability and protecting 
employees’ rights to representation, made it increasingly difficult to 
satisfy.150  For example, Joan Flynn, a former field attorney for the 
NLRB, has noted that “high employee turnover, a small or declining 
number of union members or employees authorizing union dues 
deductions, employee disinterest in union activity, inactivity on the 
union’s part . . . and employee statements regarding other employees’ 
opposition to the union” did not warrant a good-faith doubt.151 The 
NLRB had taken the good-faith doubt standard and run with it. 
The NLRB converted the good-faith doubt standard over the 
years to require positive proof of the union’s loss of majority sup-
port.152  The NLRB’s actions had functionally overruled Celanese by 
using the good-faith disbelief test instead of the good-faith uncer-
tainty as set out in Allentown Mack.153  As a result, the Levitz decision 
formally articulated how the NLRB had acted for several years.  In 
Allentown Mack the Supreme Court warned the NLRB not to 
establish a good-faith doubt standard while holding employers to 
something more.154  The NLRB corrected this by changing the stan-
dard to meet its requirement that an employer should not be able to 
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withdraw recognition of a union without the union’s actual loss of 
majority support.155 
In Levitz, the NLRB began its analysis by dealing with the Allen-
town Mack decision.156  In light of the Supreme Court’s finding that 
the NLRB could establish more stringent evidentiary burdens pro-
vided that there was sufficient notice, the NLRB stated: “In our view, 
there is no basis in either law or policy for allowing an employer to 
withdraw recognition from an incumbent union that retains the 
support of a majority of the unit employees, even on a good-faith 
belief that majority support has been lost.”157 
1. Requirements in the Language of the Act 
The NLRB noted that the language of the Act did not mention 
anything about an employer’s doubt of the union’s majority status.158  
Celanese had decided that, after the one-year certification period in 
which union representation could not be challenged, the presumption 
of majority support was rebuttable and the employer could refuse to 
bargain with a union that the employer in good faith believed no 
longer represented a majority of employees.159  In Levitz, the NLRB 
opined that it was under no obligation from the text of the Act to 
extend such a good-faith doubt standard.160  In addition, the NLRB 
held that the policy behind of the Act (and Celanese) also did not 
support an employer’s unilateral withdrawal of recognition of a 
union.161 
2. The Policy of the Act 
The policy behind the Act is well established: promotion of sta-
bility in bargaining relationships, protection of the employees’ right to 
select representation, and encouragement of collective bargaining.162  
The Levitz decision rested upon the theory that continued union 
majority status is important to each of these policies.163  Industrial 
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stability is protected because employers may not continually refuse to 
bargain with a union simply because of a good-faith doubt.164  Collec-
tive bargaining is encouraged because the employer must continue to 
bargain with the union until the union has actually lost support of a 
majority of the employees, and in that regard the employees’ right of 
representation is protected because an employer may not unilaterally 
withdraw recognition.165 
These policy reasons were also considered by the Celanese 
Board, but it decided these policies were served through other 
protections, such as the presumption of majority status for one year 
after certification, the contract bar rule, and the requirement that the 
employer must bargain with the union unless it in good faith doubts 
the union’s continued majority status.166  The NLRB recognized 
Celanese Corporation’s consistent efforts to promote collective 
bargaining prior to its development of the good-faith doubt.167  
Essentially, since in the past the employer promoted collective 
bargaining, its withdrawal of recognition must have been in good 
faith.168  The Levitz Board was not willing to extend its faith in the 
employers in such a broad manner. 
The Levitz Board pointed out that allowing employers to 
unilaterally withdraw recognition of a union violated the fundamental 
policies of the Act by harming bargaining relationships and taking 
away the employees’ right to representation.169  What the NLRB 
neglected to consider, however, were those situations in which the 
union had actually lost majority status.  The new standard requires 
the employer to continue negotiating with a union that does not 
represent a majority of the employees until an election can take 
place.170 In the past, employers felt they were in a catch-22: by with-
drawing recognition they could possibly face charges for refusing to 
bargain with employee representatives under sections 8(a)(5) and (1); 
however, by bargaining with a nonmajority union, employers could 
face charges under section 8(a)(2).171  Levitz curtailed this fear by 
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pointing out that if an employer cannot prove a union has actually 
lost majority support, it cannot be charged with bargaining with a 
nonmajority union because of the presumption that the union contin-
ues to enjoy majority support.172 
The good-faith standard, and now the actual loss standard, are 
ways for employers to rebut the presumption of majority support for 
a union.  Without absolute proof of the union’s loss of majority 
support, Levitz holds that employers should not be permitted to 
withdraw recognition.173  However, the NLRB, in its avowed interest 
of protecting employee representation, has bought a union that has 
lost majority status time to regain employee support through the 
delay of blocking charges.174  Prior to Levitz, an employer’s good-faith 
belief that its employees no longer wanted to be represented by the 
union entitled the employer to withdraw recognition and to stop 
bargaining with that union.  The NLRB in Levitz felt the protection 
of union recognition was a greater concern than the employer’s 
concern over bargaining with a nonmajority union.175 
After taking away employers’ ability to withdraw recognition 
based upon a good-faith doubt, and attempting to clear up any 
remaining confusion of the good-faith doubt standard, the NLRB also 
felt it necessary to address the use of the standard in RM elections.176 
B. The New Lower Standard for Obtaining an RM Election 
The NLRB has not concealed its preference for Board-controlled 
elections to determine employees’ union support.177  It put this 
preference into action in Levitz when it decided to lower the standard 
for obtaining RM elections.  U.S. Gypsum determined an employer 
had to show a good-faith doubt of the majority support of a union 
before it could petition for election.178  However, as in the case of 
withdrawing recognition, this standard had been twisted to require 
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objective evidence of the loss of majority support.179  Again, the 
NLRB was called upon to clarify the meaning of good-faith doubt.180 
The NLRB clearly wanted to promote the use of RM elections as 
an alternative to the unilateral withdrawal of recognition.181  The 
NLRB even pointed out an obvious contradiction: employers who 
have a good-faith doubt of the union’s majority status would rather 
withdraw recognition and hope to make a showing of the fact when 
responding to unfair labor practice charges, rather than petition the 
NLRB and wait for the results of an RM election.182  Therefore, with 
regards to RM petitions, the NLRB decided to adopt the good-faith 
uncertainty standard set out in Allentown Mack instead of the previ-
ously required good-faith disbelief, which required a higher burden of 
proof.183 
Policy considerations again influenced the NLRB’s decision-
making process.184  By making the standard for obtaining an RM 
election lower than that required to withdraw recognition of a union, 
the NLRB hoped to promote employee freedom of choice and 
industrial stability.185  A lower standard for RM elections will assist 
those employers who have a good-faith uncertainty of the employees’ 
support of the union, but may not have actual proof of the union’s 
loss of majority status.186  Furthermore, bargaining stability is pro-
moted because incumbent unions cannot lose recognition without 
absolute proof of the employees’ repudiation.187  The NLRB recog-
nized that permitting more RM elections could actually interfere with 
collective bargaining negotiations.188  However, the NLRB would 
rather the negotiations be temporarily disrupted, while the results of 
the RM elections are determined, than permanently ended through 
an employer’s unilateral withdrawal of recognition.189   
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The RM election after Levitz will likely be more useful.  The 
employer now must show a good-faith doubt of the continued major-
ity status of the union as defined by the Supreme Court in Allentown 
Mack.190  However, a major drawback to the RM election process is 
the use of the blocking charge.191  Representation elections may not 
be held in the presence of unfair labor practices.192  Therefore, as soon 
as an RM petition for election is filed, the union will file an unfair 
labor practice charge in an effort to stall the election process.193  
However, now that Levitz has limited an employer’s ability to with-
draw recognition to cases in which the employer has actual proof the 
union has lost majority status, the RM petition or polling may be the 
only remaining choices.  That being said, the Board in Levitz chose to 
“leave to a later case whether the current good-faith doubt (uncer-
tainty) standard for polling should be changed.”194 Therefore, even 
after Levitz, in order to conduct a poll, an employer must have a 
good-faith doubt as to the majority status of the union. 
C. Stare Decisis and the NLRB Decision-Making Process 
As an administrative agency, the NLRB has wide latitude over 
its rulemaking.  Still, the concurring opinion written by Member 
Hurtgen in Levitz disagreed with the major points of the majority 
decision, stating that it was too quick to overturn a fifty-year-old 
precedent.195  “In my view, there are values that are inherent in the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  These values include stability, predictability, 
and certainty of law.”196  For fifty years, employers and unions alike 
could count on the three methods of union decertification: with-
drawal, elections, and polling.  Levitz changed the rules even after the 
Supreme Court in Allentown Mack had taken such pains to clear up 
the confusion.  Some argue administrative agencies like the NLRB 
are not under the same confines of stare decisis as courts and 
judges.197  However, there is something to be said for stability and 
consistency in decisions to provide certainty about the rules of the 
 
 190. See Allentown Mack Sales and Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 376 (1998). 
 191. See Manuel, supra note 2, at 930–31. 
 192. Id. at 931. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105, slip op. at 9. 
 195. See id. at 20 (Hurtgen, concurring). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Pedrick, supra note 148, at 172. 
 404 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 78:381 
 
game.  Employers and unions are now learning a new set of rules, all 
of which could be upset by a change in the NLRB membership or a 
decision overturning Levitz.198 
As discussed above, the NLRB has favored the RM elections for 
years.199  It is only natural that when pressed to clarify its rules, the 
NLRB requires a lesser burden of proof for the preferred method.  
However, the practical effect of the Levitz decision may not accom-
plish what the NLRB had hoped.  Employer-union relations are 
complicated.  The NLRB’s hope that every employer, uncertain 
about the majority support of a union, will simply petition for election 
and then everyone (employer, union, and employees) will patiently 
await the result is naive.  In reality, the union will file unfair labor 
practice charges to delay the elections, the employer will refuse to 
negotiate with the union during the election period, and eventually 
the employees will become disenchanted with the union, with the 
employer, or with both.  The practical effect of Levitz will depend 
upon future NLRB determinations of its new dual standard.200 
D. Practical Effect of Levitz Furniture Co.  
The effect of the Levitz decision remains to be seen as the re-
maining charges pass through the system under the good-faith doubt 
test.201  The method for employers to determine whether a union 
continues to enjoy majority support has been made more straightfor-
ward by the Levitz decision, although not necessarily less compli-
cated. 
One effect of the Levitz decision was to clarify which path the 
employer wished to take at the time the union’s majority status 
becomes rebuttable. Prior to Levitz, the employer had three options 
with the same standard of proof—good-faith doubt.  This burden was 
much more difficult than the words suggested and employers faced 
unfair labor practice charges no matter what choice they made.  The 
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NLRB promoted the use of RM elections by liberalizing the standard 
to good-faith uncertainty, and discouraged employers from unilater-
ally withdrawing recognition by tightening the standard of proof to 
actual loss of majority status.202 
The general counsel of the NLRB has now defined actual loss of 
majority status: actual loss “requires a showing that is greater than 
both the Board’s previous ‘uncertainty’ standard and disbelief stan-
dard.  ‘Actual loss’ requires a showing of an actual numerical loss of a 
union’s majority support.”203  To meet its burden of proof, an em-
ployer may show actual loss though “untainted, valid evidence, such 
as a petition, that establishes that a numerical majority of unit em-
ployees no longer desires representation from the incumbent un-
ion.”204  The union may then rebut this numerical evidence by 
showing that it is unreliable or was obtained through unfair labor 
practices.205 
Cautious employers would undoubtedly choose the RM election 
route in an effort to avoid numerous unfair labor practice charges for 
withdrawing recognition.  However, unions will undoubtedly file 
unfair labor practice blocking charges to halt such elections.  Certifi-
cation elections cannot be held while there are pending unfair labor 
practice charges.206 Thus, an employer wishing to avoid unfair labor 
practice charges for unilaterally withdrawing recognition will face 
blocking charges and the election will be delayed until the unfair 
labor practice charge is decided. 
On the other hand, an employer who is able to provide proof of 
the actual loss of union support may withdraw recognition of the 
union and refuse to bargain.  Again, numerous unfair labor practice 
charges will be filed.207  The employer will have the burden “to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the union had, in fact, lost 
majority support at the time the employer withdrew recognition.”208  
The NLRB felt it necessary to place the burden upon the employer to 
prove a negative, that the union does not have support, because as an 
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affirmative defense to unfair labor practice proceedings, the employer 
would have the burden.209  Furthermore, the NLRB opined that the 
employers have access to the evidence, the information that was 
provided to them that they used to decide the union had in fact lost 
majority support.210 
Ultimately, an employer who withdraws recognition of a union 
or files for an RM petition (or even conducts its own poll, which the 
NLRB did not discuss in Levitz) faces unfair labor practice charges.  
However, the NLRB was trying to alleviate this concern by promot-
ing the use of RM elections.  The NLRB’s obvious preference for 
Board-controlled elections will more likely lead to a favorable 
outcome for the employer who utilizes this procedure.  Even an 
employer who has proof that a union has lost majority status may 
prefer to file a petition for RM election instead of unilaterally 
withdrawing recognition.  The NLRB’s obvious distaste for 
employers who unilaterally withdraw recognition should caution 
those who believe they have hard proof of the union’s loss of majority 
status. 
CONCLUSION 
The NLRB has taken a unitary standard for three different meth-
ods of questioning a union’s majority status, and converted it into 
different standards that lead to the same result.  Before Levitz, if an 
employer wished to withdraw recognition of a union, the good-faith 
doubt standard (as then applied) required employers to provide a 
virtual head count of the employees who no longer supported the 
union.  Today, the NLRB requires such a head count.  An employer 
can choose to rely upon its own proof of the union’s loss of majority 
support, or an employer can choose to petition for an RM election.  
Either way, the process will be delayed by unfair labor practice 
charges.  Ideally, the policies behind the Act will still prevail, collec-
tive bargaining will be encouraged, and employees’ freedom of self-
organization and designation of representatives will be respected. 
 
 209. See id. at 12. 
 210. See id.  
